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Abstract: We examine conceptual and methodological problems that arise in the course of the scientific study of possible influences of religious belief on the experience of physical pain. We start by attempting to identify a notion of religious belief that might enter into interesting psychological generalizations involving both religious belief and pain. We argue that it may be useful to think of religious belief as a complex dispositional property that relates believers to a sufficiently thick belief system that encompasses both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Such a conception of religious belief is more likely to correlate with psychological properties of believers that are both sufficiently shared and sufficiently unique to distinguish their psychology from believers in another religion or from non-believers. If the dispositional psychological property that constitutes religious belief does influence pain, then our analysis suggests that it doesn’t do so directly but rather through one of its occurrent manifestations. We offer a taxonomy of the different ways in which occurrent states of belief or experience may interact with physical pain, and we try to identify those that are more interesting or promising. We then proceed to employ the conceptual framework we developed to some of the existing evidence about the neural and psychological correlates of religious belief and experience, and about the cognitive modulation of physical pain. Finally we turn to analyse two experiments that directly investigated the relation between religious belief and pain. We draw attention to the limitations of existing evidence and end by suggesting directions for future conceptual and empirical inquiry.





Tradition and religious lore are full of stories about physical pain withstood and even vanquished with the power of religious belief alone. This is a view that continues to have a considerable hold on contemporary believers. One survey found that 58% of Americans have tried prayer to relieve their pain. Of these, about half reported that prayer has been extremely effective – as effective as prescription drugs.​[1]​ One sufferer from chronic pain was quoted as saying, “[e]very day I wake up and go to bed doing my meditation. I wake up with my rosary in my hand and if my pain gets so severe, I put myself in another frame of mind in the back of my head.” Another claimed that when she prays, her pain “is still there, but you don’t notice it.” 
	These are striking claims. They attribute to religious belief the same causal effect on pain as powerful drugs. How can we approach such claims from a scientific standpoint? For scientific inquiry to proceed, we need to be able to frame specific and falsifiable hypotheses that involve causal generalizations about religious belief. A host of conceptual and methodological difficulties arise from the attempt to frame such hypotheses, which we discuss in the the present chapter.
A scientific investigation of a question is not well-grounded if it does not employ an adequate conceptual framework. We need to make explicit the relation between the phenomena to be investigated and empirical phenomena accessible to scientific method, and to distinguish different types of possible causal relations between the phenomena. Crucially, we need to distinguish those questions of empirical fact that scientific inquiry can resolve from those issues of interpretation which, as a matter of principle, it cannot. In this chapter, we discuss some such conceptual issues that arise in the scientific investigation of the influence of religious belief on the modulation of pain. We will not attempt to give a definite answer to the question about the causal powers of religious belief over pain – research into this question is still in its infancy. What we try to do is to trace the path that scientific inquiry will need to take if it is to advance from the anecdotal evidence we just reported to valid scientific data and explanation.​[2]​ 
	We will start the chapter with philosophical and methodological considerations, and gradually move on to examine concrete empirical questions and evidence. Section 2 thus starts with a discussion of the concept of religious belief. We cannot hope to review here the vast literature on this topic, let alone resolve the numerous controversies raised in it. Luckily, we do not need to. What we need for our purposes is a good enough account of the kind of psychological properties that religious believers are likely to share – psychological properties of the kind that may figure in interesting psychological generalizations. As we’ll see, the psychological properties that can plausibly underlie religious belief are not themselves plausible candidates for direct causal interaction with physical pain. If religious effect has an effect on pain, this effect must be mediated by a different category of mental state. What kind of mental state this might be, and how it might causally influence physical pain, is the topic of Section 3. With this conceptual framework at hand, we turn in Section 4 to examine some of the existing scientific evidence both about religious belief and about pain. We end with an analysis of two of the few scientific studies that directly investigated the relation between religious belief and pain. 

2. RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPERTY

We want to investigate the relation between religious belief and pain. More specifically, we want to identify specific causal hypotheses relating the two, and possible mechanisms that might explain such connections. Given that pain is a mental state, the proximal cause of any modulatory effect on pain would presumably have to be some other mental state. So what we first need to do is to characterise an appropriate concept of religious belief that could play such a psychological role. 
To see why an adequate psychological concept of religious belief is so crucial, just consider any of the studies that discovered some significant difference in reported pain between religious and non-religious groups (or between groups of differing degrees of religious commitment).​[3]​ Such findings are undeniably suggestive, but they do not get us very far. Any contrast between believers and non-believers might be due to any of the many factors that may distinguish the two groups. For consider just a couple of the obvious confounding factors. How can we distinguish effects which depend only on conviction of some kind (e.g. political), from effects which necessarily depend on a specifically religious object of conviction? How do we know that there is no factor that is causally responsible both for religious belief and for any discovered difference in experience between the groups? 
We need to know rather more about what characterises a religious believer as such and to characterise their religious belief in a way that allows it to be causally involved in detected differences. So we need to think about what it is to be a religious believer, whether religious believers share relevant portions of the contents of their minds, how such contents may exert an influence over pain, and whether in doing so what occurs is distinct from what happens in the case of non-believers.

2.1. Religion and religious belief

How precisely to identify and characterise a religion is a matter of substantial controversy. The scholarly work presently available – be it conceptual, descriptive, phenomenological or experimental – shows us a rich landscape which includes systems of belief, religious experience, religious ritual, structures of religious authority, and complex relations with a social context. 
The complexity of religion has led the social sciences to approach the study of religion only after making various simplifying assumptions. Some views simply set aside the content of religious belief and focus on a claimed commonality of religious experience among believers. Others set experience aside and focus on shared belief in a narrow range of special beliefs, such as belief in a transcendent power. Yet others identify religious believers in behavioural terms, such as religious attendance, or on the basis of social factors. Such  simplifications have their benefits. The question of whether different studies are addressing similar rather than heterogeneous phenomena can always be raised, and these simplifications provide a basis for an answer.  At least in so far as the phenomena investigated are similar in the specified particular respects, the different studies are mutually relevant. But they also have their costs. 
Reductionist attempts to find a simple unifying feature that would underlie the whole span of religious belief and practice, from the rainmaker shaman to the Jehovah’s witness, can lead to a characterisation of religion as an amorphous mass of irrational ideas and peculiar behaviours. Such views may miss the internal coherence a religion may have, and may result in a distorted view of the capacity of religious belief, practice and experience to give form and meaning to the believer’s life. Sympathetic simplifications may also distort. William James’s focus on religious experience, to take up just one example, led to poor methodological discernment of the essential plurality of religious beliefs and experiences. The more recent emphasis on non-religious spirituality, popularly understood as the subjective experience of a transcendent force that binds all beings and things together and which is common to all religions, is an impoverished concept of religious belief as such and of religious experience. Even within a seemingly homogeneous religious tradition like Christianity, the past and present diversity of theological interpretations and religious practices cannot be taken as mere erudite disputes or cultural variation which bear no real significance for the lives of the religious individual. Religious beliefs and experiences do not exist in a vacuum: they both shape and are shaped by concrete individuals, have different shades of meaning at different times, and affect the course of events.
On the one hand, the social model is too broad. Social and institutional accounts of religion, whatever their merits, tell us little about shared psychological properties that might figure in causal explanations and generalisations. A believer’s role in a social network, his participation in various religious practices, and his general behaviour are, at best, the distal causes of any relation between religious belief and pain. The proximal causes will invariably be located in his psychology. Furthermore, even complete overt conformity to the dictates and practices of a given religion isn’t sufficient for belief in that religion. To see this, think of a Jewish converso in medieval Spain who, while fully conforming to Christian practice in his public behaviour, nevertheless secretly clings to his faith inwardly. For our purposes, we clearly need to look for an exclusively psychological notion of religious belief.
On the other hand, although the experiential and special belief models meet the latter requirement, they are too narrow. They identify religious involvement in terms of a narrow range of particular mental states, but religious belief itself is not a simple matter of a small number of mental states. The influence of religious belief on pain, even if mediated on any particular occasion by particular mental states, may be more extensive than these models would allow. 
To identify the psychological account of religious belief that we need, we can start with the near truism that being a religious believer is a matter of having certain kinds of extensive relations to a religion. A significant extent of those relations will be those constituted by having certain psychological properties, and hence those properties are especially significant for what it is to be a believer. Given the constitutive role and consequent special significance, it would be reasonable to identify those properties as the religious belief of a believer. So let us call these psychological properties that relate a believer to their religion their personal religious belief.

2.2. Substantial commonality of religious belief

Granted that believers in the same religion are engaged with the same religious belief system, there remains the problem of what is to count as comprehensive engagement adequate to the substantial commonality of religious belief needed for our purposes. There are clearly some problems here. If a belief system is thin (or interpreted in a thin way), then it is less likely to be underpinned by distinctive psychological properties of an interesting sort. So it seems that purely cognitive systems are unlikely to play the causal role we need. On the other hand, the thicker and richer the system, the more we face the problem that there are many elements at play, and different believers might possess or relate only to a selection of these.
Even setting aside such non-cognitive attitudes, religious belief systems are so rich that it is unlikely that any believer believes the entirety of any particular religion’s beliefs (in the sense of possessing mental states encoding it, as opposed, for example, to being disposed to defer to what religious authority informs them of the doctrine). However, believers do not acquire their religious belief at random, but in a highly organized manner. Whilst a creed on its own seems proportionally too thin to constitute a substantial commonality, the existence of a creed is a manifestation of the currents within religion which seek to foster commonality between believers. Being a believer often involves study of religious texts, substantial learning of religious doctrine and acquiring the unwritten lore by engaging with other believers in word and deed. Consequently, whilst it is true that both the written and unwritten lore of a religion are unevenly distributed between believers, and also that religions vary with the respect to which they promulgate doctrinal conformity on the basis of authoritative interpretation, believers in the same religion are likely to share a substantial body of religious attitudes (attitudes including cognitions, conations and volitions). This would constitute a thick belief system, with psychological properties that shape the conscious states of a believer. 

3. BELIEF, CONSCIOUSNESS AND PAIN

If religious belief is a belief system, in what way can it effect pain, a particular state of consciousness? We’ll start with some general considerations about the relation between belief and consciousness. We will then look at religious belief, and at pain, more closely.
A belief system is best understood as a complex network of propositional contents and a range of associated propositional attitudes. For an agent to hold a certain belief system is for that person to have a complex dispositional property, a property that may often be latent, and that can be manifested in behaviour in a range of different ways. Since conscious mental states such as pain are occurrent states, we need a way of linking the two. 
A religious believer remains one when asleep, when eating breakfast or driving a car. His belief may or may not colour his everyday life. But they will typically emerge to the surface of consciousness and behaviour in particular contexts – contexts when religious belief is relevant, needs to be directly brought to bear on ongoing events, whether in the surrounding world or in the person’s inner life. Even then, it is not the entire belief system that is activated all at once. Usually it will be certain relevant aspects of it that will emerge to guide thought, feeling and action. Personal loss, philosophical reflection, or hopeful coincidence will each draw on a different facet of the person’s faith. 

3.1 Propositional belief 

The aspects of a personal belief system that will be activated at different points will involve constellations of different, interrelated mental elements, including cognitions, conations and volitions. Central among these will be propositional beliefs – including evaluative beliefs – and we’ll focus on these for the moment. Later we’ll explain how our analysis can be extended to other mental states.
When philosophers write about belief, they usually have in mind something far narrower than the concept of religious belief or of a belief system. What they write about is a basic type of mental state, the attitude of holding a certain proposition (however trivial) to be true. It is in this sense of belief that agents are said to believe that the sun has set, that the weather is bad, that the election was fixed, and so forth. A belief system such as a religion will contain many beliefs in this narrower sense. 
We will not attempt a definition of this philosophical notion of belief. Suffice it to say that beliefs are attitudes towards propositional contents, that they guide intentional behaviour, that they are what is expressed in sincere indicative assertion and in private thought, and that agents normally have first-person authority about their beliefs – they normally know directly what it is they believe. 
What is important for our purposes is to note that belief, in this narrower philosophical sense, is a demanding concept. Not every informational or representational state of an agent is a belief. The arrayed scene presented to me in perceptual experience isn’t a belief, even if perception is ultimately the source of many of my empirical beliefs. Nor is the know how we use in riding bicycles and other forms of skilful behaviour a form of belief.
Perceptual experience and know how, although not state of belief, are nevertheless informational state of the person. In Dennett’s (1987) terms, they are personal-level states. We need to distinguish these from sub-personal states – states ascribed not to the person but to various psychological or neural systems within him. Low-level representations of the visual scene in a person’s cortex or representations of reward in his amygdala are not beliefs of the agent, not even unconscious beliefs (though such states may play a role in a causal explanation of the agent’s beliefs).
We are interested in the way beliefs, drawn from a person’s belief system, may have a causal effect on his or her conscious states. Beliefs are best understood as dispositional states, even if far simpler ones. But unlike an entire belief system, particular beliefs can become activated – become occurrent states of the agent – at particular points in time. One way in which a belief can become occurrent is by directly surfacing in an agent’s consciousness – by becoming a conscious thought. 

3.2 Consciousness and pain

Turn now to consciousness. We are interested in state-consciousness – in particular conscious states, like pain. Philosophers have been mostly interested in phenomenal consciousness, that hard (or impossible) to describe way that it feels like to be in pain or to experience the redness of an apple. If there is a problem of consciousness, it’s the problem of explaining how neural states can be identical to such ‘raw feels’ or qualia. 
Pain is certainly poised for control of thought and action, and there’s most certainly something it is like to feel pain. Unsurprisingly, philosophers have often taken pain to be the paradigmatic example of a conscious state. Unfortunately, pain is rather more complex than most philosophers of mind realise. It usually hurts to be in pain – that’s one obvious way in which pain is “poised to control action.” But people who’ve undergone frontal lobotomy don’t seem to mind their pain. They seem to feel the sensory aspect of pain without feeling its affective side – without feeling it unpleasant. Scientists studying pain usually add a third, cognitive component – the immediate interpretation that an agent gives to the sensory and affective experience. Thus agents may expect the pain to last long or to end soon, associate it with grave injury or take it to be harmless. Pain may be a paradigmatic state of consciousness, but it’s also a rather complex mental state. Claims about the modulation of pain need to distinguish between these multiple dimensions.

3.3 Ways in which belief may effect consciousness

There are a number of distinctions in the kinds of influence which belief (and hence religious belief) might have on pain: 
(1) Modulation vs. endurance. We must distinguish claims about the causal effects of religious belief on pain itself and claims about its effects on the way agents respond to pain. In particular, we need to distinguish the claim that religious belief reduces pain and the claim that it helps believers to better endure their pain. No doubt on some reading of the proposition that religious belief effects the perception of pain all that is meant is that it increases believers’ endurance. We, however, are more interested in the rather ambitious causal effect: the claim that religious belief can directly modulate the intensity and unpleasantness of pain. 
(2) Physical pain vs. overall unpleasantness. Even if religious belief could, in certain contexts, lead to a reduction of the unpleasantness of the believer’s experience, this might still not involve a direct reduction of his physical pain. For belief might affect rather the anxiety and distress that often accompany physical pain without actually changing it in any way. It may do so in a number of ways – by allowing the sufferer to give a benign or reassuring interpretation to the painful event. 
(3) Direct vs. indirect modulation. What we are asking, then, is whether belief can modulate the physical pain itself – reduce its intensity and unpleasantness. Such an effect, however, may only be an indirect one. It may not be the presence of the occurrent belief that would itself modulate the level of pain, but some further, non-cognitive mediating psychological state. For example, the activated belief may influence attention or affect in ways that would then have an effect on pain. 
(4) Specific vs. non-specific effects. A related distinction has to do with the source of the modulatory effect. Since beliefs are individuated by their contents, this is really a question about the role of the belief’s content in the modulation of pain. In the context of our present inquiry, it would be most interesting if it would be the specifically religious content of an agent’s beliefs that would have the relevant effect on pain rather than some content or property that religious belief may share with secular belief systems. 
The above distinctions give us a taxonomy of possible ways in which states of belief may influence conscious states such as pain. Different combinations of the above would give different possible causal relations that empirical inquiry may identify and investigate. 

Figure 1: Possible causal relations between occurrent belief and physical pain

Let’s pull together the different strands of the discussion. We are interested in the influence of religious belief on pain and we have suggested that this influence is mediated by occurrent mental states. We are thereby interested in possible causal relations between occurrent states of propositional belief and experiences of pain. We are not interested in causal relations between sub-personal states and pain. To identify a specific causal relation between belief and pain we must identify which beliefs are in question – that is, to identify beliefs in particular propositions, and we need to identify which of the different dimensions of pain has been influenced – sensory, affective, cognitive. So there is the possibility of different causal relations for different combinations of these, and to fully understand the influence of religious belief on pain will require knowledge of these relations.
	We’ve so far focused on possible causal influence of belief on physical pain. This focus may seem unduly restrictive. For isn’t it rather religious experience that is the primary occurrent form of the manifestation of a religious belief system? In reply, let us draw us attention to two important points. First, talk of religious experience sometimes refers to a rather rare and exalted form of experience. Such extraordinary experiences, although of obvious scientific interest, couldn’t be definitive of religious belief itself. Many believers enjoy such experiences extremely rarely, if at all. Second, there are modes of distinctively religious affect and experience that are probably quite common and most probably central to possession of religious belief. However, the emphasis here should be on ‘distinctively religious’, and we’d like to suggest that the only thing that makes such experiences religious is their intentional content. And this means that we must identify such experiences in the same way we would identify a corresponding propositional belief. Indeed, certain propositional beliefs may have intrinsic connection to affect and motivation. So, as we’ve hinted earlier, our remarks about the relation between propositional belief and pain can be extended to cover other occurrent mental states that derive from an agent’s belief system. 

4. FROM RELIGIOUS BELIEF TO PAIN: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

It’s time to turn from rarefied conceptual analysis to some hard empirical data. In this section, we’ll apply the considerations adduced so far to relevant empirical evidence, highlighting problems and pointing out important omissions. Religious experience is one central way in which a religious belief system manifests itself in occurrent mental states, and is thus a natural contact point with physical pain. How might such a cognitive-experiential state interact with pain? Setting aside religion, we’ll survey some of the empirical data on the modulation of pain by various cognitive states. We then, finally, try to tie the different strands of the discussion together by analysing two experimental studies of the relation between religious belief and pain. By this point, it will be clear that much further empirical work is still needed. 

4.1 Religious belief and religious experience

Azari argues that religious experience is itself an essentially cognitive phenomenon, neurologically distinct from brute emotion and not necessarily marked by limbic activity in the brain. This result tends to undermine a sharp distinction between religious belief and religious experience. In particular, her study of religious experience is in sharp contrast to other studies, especially by Persinger and colleagues (see for example Persinger 2002), who have claimed to be able to trigger a mystical sensed presence when applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the temporal lobes, thus justifying the pre-cognitive character of religious experiences. 
Another study, which unsuccessfully attempted to replicate Persinger’s studies, has yielded results which partly support Azari’s hypothesis. Although in this study the application of Persinger’s TMS technique didn’t result in a significant increase in reports of religious experiences, there were however some personality characteristics, such as suggestibility and the adoption of a New Age lifestyle orientation, which were correlated with a higher report of mystical experiences (Granqvist et al. 2005). In their conclusion the authors emphasise the multifactorial nature of religious experience, involving motivational, cognitive and also personality factors, which cannot be equated with easily defined neurophysiological states.  
The few psychological experimental studies on religious experience support this multifactorial hypothesis, by showing that there is a combination of factors working together to produce a religious experience (for a review, see Hood et al, 1996). The cognitive component of possessing a religious belief system seems to be a sine qua non condition for the occurrence of a religious experience; otherwise a merely aesthetical interpretation of a state of physiological arousal is much more likely to be reported. The setting is another crucial variable, i.e. whether the experience happens in a religious environment or even in association with a particular religious image or text. A religious person would also be more motivated to have a religious experience, and would have ‘learned’ how to associate, or even direct, one’s emotional states in regard to a certain religious object (this is very characteristic of religious devotion to holy figures or objects). Finally, the variety of techniques available in the religious traditions to facilitate such experiences, also show us that people are affected in different ways by various types of religious stimulation, i.e. there are individual differences in the way religious experiences are triggered. For example, a person who easily gets into a deep state of contemplation by praying the rosary, may not be affected by a piece of sacred music which triggers a religious experience in another person. These results are in line with our earlier discussion of religious belief: being a complex dispositional property, it would be a conceptual mistake to identify it with any simple psychological state, let alone an occurrent state such an experience. Similarly, disputes between researchers about the character and neural correlates of religious experience may be due to failure to distinguish between distinct forms of religious experience and affect. As we noted several times, a religious belief system may manifest itself through different occurrent states in different contexts. We cannot compare the conflicting results of different studies of religious experience if we don’t have a working criteria of identity for such experiences, which as we’ve seen requires a specification of the intentional contents being activated. 
Notwithstanding the plurality of triggers for religious experience, what is central to our understanding of its occurrence is the overall importance of a previously held system of religious beliefs and the religious setting in which the experience takes place. If religious experiences do not happen in a cognitive vacuum, they are also not likely to occur unless there are cues (visual, acoustic) which make the person relate an experience to a religious framework. To make it more clear: religious people are not always thinking religiously. In fact, they tend to give more naturalistic than religious causal explanations to events in their lives (Lupfer et al. 1992). The experience of God’s ubiquitous presence in our lives, in the way some Christian mystics tell us about, is not a common experience. Even someone like Theresa of Avila talked of how, in prayer, her mind tended to wander away from focusing on God (see Atran 2002).

4.2 Cognitive and Affective Modulation of Pain

Turn now to cognitive modulation of pain. It may seem that we’ve earlier characterised the phenomenon of direct modulation of pain by cognitive states in such a narrow sense to pretty much exclude everything. If belief and pain are personal level states, and if we focus only on the physical pain itself rather than on various forms of anxiety or distress that may accompany it, then how could a state of belief directly affect physical pain? Surely there are no personal-level connections that could do this job? This worry seems to us basically correct. However our taxonomy leaves space for a further kind of relation: that of sub-personal causation between two personal-level states (such causation would be of course mediated by a sub-personal mechanism of some sort). And in fact recent scientific inquiry has uncovered a surprisingly diverse range of ways in which cognitive states appear to modulate physical pain (Oharaa et al. 2005; Petrovic & Ingvar 2002). We do not have space to give a detailed survey of these findings. We’ll only briefly mention some of the most striking ones.
The most familiar, of course, is the placebo effect. Although some researchers have doubted its very existence as a general phenomenon (Hróbjartsson & Gøtzsche 2001), brain imaging studies have not only robustly established its existence, but also begun to identify the precise mechanisms of endogenous analgesia that the placebo effect exploits (Hoffman et al. 2005; Wager et al. 2004; Zubieta et al. 2005; Petrovic et al. 2005; Petrovic et al. 2002; Colloca & Benedetti 2005). So here we have an example of a higher cognitive state, the belief that the pain will get better, directly causing that very result, the decrease of the pain. So does, apparently, the belief that one has control over the pain (Salomons 2004). But it is not only belief that may have this effect. The strength of the desire for the pain to stop may also play such a role, and emotions such as hope have been shown to lead to increased tolerance for pain (Breznitz, Shlomo 1999). 
The placebo effect is the most familiar, but there are other ways in which cognitive states modulate pain. For example, the recruitment of attention to other tasks reduces felt pain (Bantick et al. 2002; Petrovic et al. 2000; Tracey et al. 2002), and exposure to images or stimuli that tend to induce positive affect reduce felt pain, whereas exposure to images laden with negative affect does the opposite (Meagher 2001; Villemure 2002; Vogt 2005; de Wied & Verbaten 2001). 

4.3 Religious belief and the experience of pain

We are now finally in a position to consider the relation between religious belief and pain. We’ve initially set out from some anecdotal evidence that religious belief has some special bearing on the experience of pain. But from a scientific standpoint, all that this establishes is that there are religious believers who believe in such a connection. It is no more than a suggestive starting point for empirical inquiry. 
The relevant work usually falls under the heading of research on religious belief and coping. Such research examines the beneficial role of religious belief in coping strategies with various conditions of adverse health, and naturally pain and suffering play prominent roles in these. A quick look at such research suggests that there are many methods of religious coping, some of which do indeed seem to be correlated with positive physical and mental health outcomes. These methods range from framing the painful or stressful event in terms that allow for its positive appraisal (as in the thought that ‘this suffering might bring me closer to God’), to seeking religious support from clergy (Pargament et al. 2000). Most coping strategies involve active adaptation, both physical and mental, to stressful or painful situations. The individual does not become numb to the pain, but finds a way to live with it or even alleviate it by assigning a particular meaning to it, a meaning derived from his religious belief.
The diversity of coping strategies, even within members of a single religious tradition, should not be surprising. As we saw earlier, a given belief system can be brought to bear on present experience in a wide variety of ways. It does not have a single experiential or behavioural manifestation. Given this diversity, there may be a range of ways in which religious belief may interact with experiences of pain. 
Even if we focus on particular strategies of religious coping, we are still at a great distance from identifying specific psychological mechanisms through which religious belief may modulate pain. The research in question focuses on large scale strategies of coping over time. This may give it greater ecological validity, but lesser methodological rigour. A range of personality and sociological factors may interact over time to affect patients’ experiences of adversity. So most existing research on coping simply operates at the wrong level of magnification for our purposes.
Another problem is that it is very hard to distinguish, within this work, between strategies that allow for increased tolerance of suffering over time, and strategies that may directly shape the experience of pain (recall our earlier distinction). It is ever harder to distinguish methods of modulating physical pain from strategies for controlling overall distress or anxiety.
It would have been better if, within this large and growing body of work, there were more controlled attempts to identify ways in which religious belief may directly affect physical pain. We were only able to find a handful.  Let us briefly describe three of these rare studies. 
An early paper which used a task that involved putting the participants’ hands in ice cold water reports that two out of four yogis in a deep state of religious meditation were able to keep their hands for 45-55 minutes in the water without experiencing any discomfort or registering any changes in their EEG records (Anand et al. 1961). This study, it must be admitted, is not much better than mere anecdotal evidence. No control group was used and the study seems mostly interested in attesting the unusual capacity of yogis to block any external stimulation by the use of a sophisticated physical-mental technique of concentration and religious experience (samadhi).
Setting aside the question of validity, let us make two methodological remarks. One is that although the study tested the yogis’ capacity to endure pain over time, it seems natural to interpret the extraordinary endurance reported to be due to a genuine reduction in the level of experienced pain. The second is that this reduction, if this is indeed what it was, was clearly mediated by a distinctive experiential state. It is clearly an experiential state that is the result of prolonged and intense practice within the framework of a particular religious tradition. It is not entirely clear, though, whether this causal history is sufficient to make such a state of mind distinctively religious.
Moving forward in time to a more recent study, and from Eastern to Western religious traditions, Wachholtz and Pargament (2005) compared how various methods of spiritual meditation, practised 20 minutes daily for two weeks, led to different psychological and physical outcomes. There were three experimental groups in this study. One of them simply employed a technique of non-verbal relaxation. The other two groups had a short sentence which they repeated to themselves. While one of these two groups engaged in what the authors call ‘secular meditation,’ i.e. meditation on a self-attribute (e.g. ‘I am good’), the other one instead focused on a God attribute, such as ‘God is peace’ (or good, joy or love). It was this latter group, the ‘spiritual meditation’ group, which showed the most significant results, namely a decrease in anxiety, more positive mood, and they were also able to withstand better the pain of holding their hands in ice cold water, by keeping it inside the water for almost twice as long as the other groups (about 1.5 minutes).​[4]​
It is not clear what psychological mechanism mediated this difference between the three groups, nor what role religious belief or experience played in it. There seems to be little doubt, however, that this difference involved greater tolerance, not direct modulation of pain. 
The authors explain that it was not the subjective perception of pain that was altered but the capacity of enduring it. We may ask: what is there in the repetition of a God attribute that may make people cope better with pain than by simple relaxation or focusing on a positive self-attribute? Could it be the experience of feeling closer to God activated by the spiritual meditation task, as the authors suggest? If it is, it would be an interesting case in showing how an experience with a distinctly religious content may affect the modulation of pain. The existing evidence, however, falls far short of support for such a claim, as it does not rule the causal involvement of a range of possible factors that are generic – whether the placebo effect or the influence of attention or simple positive affect.




Figure 2: Participants were instructed to focus on the image that was displayed 30 s before and during the application of the electrical stimulation. In each trial a series of 20 painful electric stimuli were applied to the back of the left hand. After the stimulation had stopped the participants rated the intensity of the electric stimuli and to what an extent they had been affected by the image. At the end of each block a circle appeared on the computer screen that signaled a baseline period of 12 s.

Religious participants reported a decrease in pain when meditating on the religious image. They also showed an activation of the right ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and we found a negative correlation between subjective pain intensity and activation of the right VLPFC ​— the lower the pain, the stronger the activation. The specific psychological role of religious belief in the cognitive modulation of pain was further substantiated by the phenomenological accounts. Religious participants reported thoughts of a religious content when presented with the religious image (e.g. “I felt calmed down and peaceful”; “I prayed”; “I thought of Mary’s suffering and of her courage”; “I felt being taken care of”; “I felt compassion and support”). On the other hand, both groups described their largely positive experience of the non-religious image using only aesthetic terms (e.g., religious group: “I liked the picture and found it interesting”; “I liked the features of her face”; non-religious group: “She looked serene, chilled out”; “She looked attractive”). 

	What seems to have happened is that, for religious people, looking at the image of the Virgin Mary allowed them to reinterpret the emotional significance of pain – what has been described as reappraisal in the literature on emotion regulation (Gross, 2002). In other words, reappraisal occur when individuals change their emotional response by altering the threat value of the stimulus. In the case of our experiment, participants might have partly changed the threat value of the noxious stimuli by focusing on their religious beliefs. This is different from an attention or distraction strategy, where you focus away from the pain. However, we can only claim that the experience of pain was reduced or alleviated not directly, but via an indirect cognitive modulation. 

Overall, what these studies suggest is that, in the most interesting cases, religious belief is not directly brought to bear on pain, but is brought to bear on present pain through the mediation of distinctive modes of experience, cognition or affect. This is in line with our analysis above, in which we distinguished the link from religious belief to mediating occurrent mental states and the link between such occurrent states. 




Recent research on top-down modulation of pain has revealed a wealth of striking findings. But such research has focused on the modulatory powers of very narrow range of generic mental states – states such as expectation or positive affect. This approach to the subject may overlook the way that more distinctive mental states, states with richer and more specific content, may control pain. Anecdotal evidence, and general research on religious belief and coping, strongly suggests that religious belief may be such a state. The pitfall here is that religious belief is not even in the same conceptual category as expectation, affect or propositional belief. How then can we identify a distinctively religious mode of pain modulation?
In the early part of this chapter we have discussed some of the hazards that too coarse grained a criterion of religious believer would pose for investigating the influence of religious belief as such on the modulation of pain. Even if we wisely refrain from the attempt to give sharp necessary and sufficient conditions for religious belief, it is clear that it is a very complex psychological property that includes a range of distinctive dispositional and occurrent mental states. Empirical research that ignores this is not likely to genuinely advance our understanding of either religious belief or pain modulation. 
There are a number of possibilities that need to be considered for states playing mediating causal roles. It would be most interesting if such states are identifiable by distinctive intentional content or character. In such cases it might be that a mediating state is of an apparently religious content or character, is of an apparently non-religious content or character or is not clearly either. All of these possibilities return us to the difficult conceptual and empirical task of defining what is distinctively religious. What does seem clear is that for such a state (cognitive or affective) to be distinctively religious, it needs to have a distinctively religious intentional content, though it may be that its effect of pain would not be direct but mediated by yet another, simpler mental state. For these reasons it seems likely that there will be significant controversies to be negotiated in interpreting the results of experiments. For example, in our own experiment, believers did engage with their religious beliefs while experiencing pain. But it is possible that a different kind of belief system thick enough (e.g. political) would also allow for a cognitive reappraisal of the perception of pain. 
Much further empirical work will be needed to illuminate the links between a religious belief system and distinctive occurrent mental states, and between such occurrent states and pain. Further empirical and conceptual work is also needed to identify the sense in which such mediating occurrent states can be said to be distinctively religious in nature or content, as opposed to being caused by a religious belief system. 
Given the complexity of conceptual and empirical issues we have identified, it is clear that investigating the influence of religious belief on the modulation of pain will require progressive development and refinement of methodology. Precisely what those developments will be is not clear at this stage of research.  Presently it may suffice if we can distinguish the effects in our proffered taxonomy and rule out the explanation of the causal effect in terms of various generic mental states that have been independently identified. Subsequently we may try to get closer to determining whether it is something distinctively religious that is causally influential, and if so, what that is. In that case, methods to distinguish the content of religious belief responsible for the occurrent causally efficacious states, and methods to distinguish the content and character of those occurrent states, will have to be developed. 
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^1	  Around 90% of those who tried prayer claimed it was effective. The survey was conducted by ABC News, USA Today and Stanford University Medical Center. See ABC News, May 12th, 2005.
^2	  By definition, science is the investigation of natural entities and the natural relations between them (the laws of nature). Supernatural causation is, by definition, not bounded by natural laws. A true supernatural explanation of the outcome of an experiment would therefore invalidate inferences about nature based on that experiment. Consequently, scientists must assume that there is not a supernatural explanation of the phenomena they investigate.  So we must assume that if religious belief does have a causal influence on physical pain, this influence doesn’t involve any supernatural powers. As we’ll see, this assumption is far from ruling out that the effect of belief on pain is distinctly and uniquely religious.
^3	  For example, Koenig and his colleagues have found that patients with sickle cell disease who go to church once a week or more reported less pain than other groups. See Harrison et al. (2005).
^4	  These findings, while significant, are of course far weaker than the dramatic ones reported by the Indian study (setting aside, again, the question of its validity). This highlights another difference between the two studies. The first examined a small and selected group of highly trained practitioners of a certain religious practice. The second examined a fairly ordinary sample of ordinary believers. So these studies nicely illustrate the ways in which claims about the causal efficacy of religious belief can relate to thicker or thinner shared psychological properties, as we’ve explained earlier in the chapter. Research is more likely to find radical forms of pain modulation in select groups of believers. On the other hand, it may be that the distinctive psychological properties shared by members of such select groups is the cause of such membership, rather than caused by it. 
^5	  Notice that in the Wachholtz and Pargament study, the comparison wasn’t between religious and non-religious subjects but between subjects of presumably roughly the same level of religious belief. The reported difference between the groups presumably had to do with the fact that in the ‘religious meditation’ group this belief was also activated.
